Honorable City Council,
Back in September 2023, I expressed my concerns about the deployment of Flock camera technology in Menlo Park. I am writing today to express my ongoing concerns about Menlo Park becoming part of this vast, nationwide surveillance network.
I have read the new staff report, and it doesnt present any hard data about crime reduction based on ALPR use. It is mostly supposition.
The reality is that a very small percentage of license plates scanned will actually be connected to a crime. On the other hand, it is a significant outlay of our small budget. For me, the privacy trade-offs and potential for abuse of this data by individuals and law enforcement agencies is not justified by the data presented.
This report draws a direct line between installing ALPR systems in Foster City and South SF without any substantiating data. How do we know that crime rates wouldnt have dropped without these cameras? How do we know what can be directly attributed to ALPR vs other programs, policies, staffing levels, or any other factors?
This report states that ALPR technology "helps solve crimes", but doesnt provide any substantiating data. Where is the data on solve rates and methods?
Without real data showing huge benefits to overall public safety, I dont think the risk to civil liberties can be justified.
If, however, this technology is to be adopted, there need to be strong guardrails and transparency around the collection, sharing, and storage of data.
For example, there needs to be community input on what types of crimes merit inclusion on an ALPR hot list.
Law enforcement use of the data must be logged and stored so it can be audited.
Audits must be conducted to ensure there are no disparate impacts on certain members or of a community, for example, or the targeting of protestors.
These basic recommendations, along with the audit recommendations cited below, are covered in this report from the Brennan Center:
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/automatic-license-plate-readers-legal-status-and-policy-recommendations
I respecfully urge Council to ensure that all possible steps are taken to safeguard privacy and to reduce the possibility of data misuse--or abuse.
Regards,
Katherine Dumont
Resident, Menlo Park
Audit recommendations from the Brennan Center:
*Maintain audit logs: Law enforcement use of ALPR data should be logged and stored in a format that permits auditing. First, a log should maintain details about automated ALPR alerts, including the reason for the alert, whether any information was automatically shared with other agencies, and the outcome of the alert. Second, logs should track every time an officer seeks to access historical ALPR data as part of an investigation. This log should specify the officer and the crime being investigated and require evidence that a warrant has been obtained or specification of the exigent circumstances that mandate quicker access. If this functionality is not available through vendor platforms, law enforcement should establish internal access controls to ensure the same outcome.
Separately, each police department should establish a log that tracks and catalogs all the ways they receive, store, and share ALPR data. This includes the license plate reads collected by their own devices, as well as those provided by other law enforcement agencies, by private vendors, and voluntarily by businesses and individuals. Many vendor platforms provide automated methods for tracking and updating authorized data flows, but each department should appoint an appropriate office to lead their efforts to track and maintain this log. When a department elects to share ALPR data with another law enforcement agency, the parties should enter into data sharing arrangements ensuring that policies regarding access control and retention are at least as strict as those of the originating agency. The receiving agency should also commit to entering into similar data sharing agreements for any downstream data sharing. Without adequate steps to protect downstream data sharing, even the most rigid policies will be insufficient once data is shared with a department that does not maintain the same level of protection.
*Conduct audits for disparate impact: Law enforcement use of ALPRs should be periodically audited in order to protect against disparate impact on historically marginalized communities and constitutionally protected activities. These audits should evaluate the times and locations where ALPRs are used to ensure that they are not being used to disproportionately target particular communities or constitutionally protected activities such as protests. To facilitate this process, law enforcement agencies must keep records that detail the locations where ALPRs are deployed and the areas where historical searches are being run. Audits should also assess the types of investigations that merit a vehicle’s inclusion on a hot list to ensure that low-level offenses are not effectively being used to target vulnerable communities. Audits should evaluate the extent to which ALPR data is used with other surveillance technologies — such as predictive policing algorithms or inclusion in gang databases — in a manner that could disproportionately harm historically marginalized groups or constitutionally protected activity.
*Conduct audits to ensure effective safeguards: Every ALPR policy should include regular audits to evaluate safeguard effectiveness. These audits should ensure that ALPR data is only available to employees with a need to access the data, that their access is promptly terminated when no longer necessary, and that ALPR searches are appropriately limited to specific law enforcement investigations. Ongoing oversight of the use of ALPR data within law enforcement agencies is an essential safeguard to detect and prevent officers’ misuse of the system.
